Developing Organizations and Leaders/“The 56th Armored Brigade Combat Team”

Requirement: This is your end-of-block exam for L100. The purpose of this assessment is for you to demonstrate your achievement of the TLO for L100. The TLO for L100 is, “Explain how field grade officers lead in the development of organizations and leaders to achieve results.”
This exam is based on the 56th Armor Brigade Combat Team case study and the L100 learning objectives. The L100 exam case study is available to you in a separate document. You will answer the questions from the perspective of the new brigade commander, LTC (P) Osborne.

You will synthesize the organizational development processes you learned from the L100 lessons (specifically L101-L109) and apply them to a problem. The assessment rubric for the exam is listed below on page two and provides the grading criteria for the exam question. Ensure you address the specified criteria when formulating your response. Ensure you write your response as an essay.

The L100 exam requires you to write your essay in first person to take personal credit for your leadership knowledge, skills, and abilities. Your answer will be no less than four (4) pages and no more than five (5) pages in length (double-spaced, using 12-point Times New Roman Font, and one-inch margins). Your completed essay is due at the end of the block, after lesson L111. The L100 exam is worth 60% of the L100 block grade.

In addition to the case study, you MUST integrate concepts from L100 into your responses. Specifically, you should use some of the models or theories discussed in L100 as you answer your exam. However, do NOT regurgitate the process or model; instead, explain how you will use the process or model applied to the exam case study. Finally, you do not have to submit a CGSC Form 1009w writing evaluation for this assignment.

Always cite your sources. If something is not your original thought, you need to cite your source using either footnotes or endnotes IAW the Turabian style of documentation; do not use parenthetical citations. This includes direct quotations, paraphrases, and summaries of the assigned readings, doctrinal references, or outside sources. You may use the L100 online lessons, readings, and reference materials to help you prepare your assignment. You also may use ST 22-2 as a reference for writing.

ALL work must be your own. You may NOT discuss this exam with any other person except your DDE academic advisor or faculty member. Another person may proofread your paper for correctness and clarity only; however, this person may not be a current or former CGSOC student. You must list this person as a reference in your footnotes or endnotes.

CGSC does not tolerate cheating, plagiarism, or unauthorized collaboration. Therefore, you should review CGSC Bulletin #920, Academic Ethics Policy (February 2011) and the DDE Academic Ethics brief posted on the course information page. Violation of academic ethics will result in an investigation and possible removal from the course.

Questions

Using concepts from L100, what is the critical leadership problem facing the 56th ABCT? How will you use the processes and concepts from L100 to improve the ABCT and achieve your vision? Clearly and comprehensively, explain, defend and justify your answers.
Assessment Rubric
Evaluative Criteria (90 Points)
Score

Apply critical-thinking skills to identify, explain, and defend the selection of the critical leadership problem. Use relevant facts and assumptions from the 56th ABCT case study to support your argument. (30 Points)

Describe your vision for the brigade. (10 Points)

Applying concepts and processes from L100, describe how you will solve the problem, implement your vision and how you will measure effectiveness in achieving your vision. (50 Points) 1
Communication Criteria (10 Points)

The introduction clearly states the thesis and introduces major points.

Major points are fully developed using clear reasoning.

The conclusion reinforces the thesis and major points.

Style is concise, primarily in active voice, and generally free of errors in grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

Proper use of citations IAW ST 22-2.

US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
L100: Developing Organizations and Leaders

L100 Exam Case Study
AY 13-14
“The 56th Armored Brigade Combat Team”

You are LTC Osborne a promotable lieutenant colonel who commanded a battalion in the 56th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). One month ago, you returned to the 56th ABCT after a 2 ½-year absence to assume the deputy brigade commander’s (DCO) position. While you are excited about getting reacquainted and acclimated with your old unit, you know a lot has happened, including a deployment, in your absence.

The 56th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) returned from Afghanistan 55 days ago and is now in its RESET phase of the ARFORGEN process. The 56th’s parent division headquarters and the other divisional BCTs did not deploy with the brigade. Instead, the 56th ABCT worked for two other divisions during their deployment and with a number of other BCTs. Further, due to operational needs and capability shortfalls in another brigade, the 56th detached one of its combined arms battalions for thirteen of the deployment’s fifteen months. The brigade has been back at home station for almost two months; reintegration training and block leave are complete. As you settle into your new position and surroundings, you realize that few, if any, of the ABCT staff remains from your last tour with the unit. Further, many of the current ABCT staff will PCS in the next few months. The change of command for five of the battalions is scheduled in the next 30 days. Your initial conversations with COL Timmons, the brigade commander (BCO) and CSM Rose, the brigade command sergeant major, were positive. Both appear to have genuine concerns about the actions needed to improve the brigade and prepare it for the next mission. Your discussions with LTC (P) Mills, the outgoing deputy brigade commander (DCO), seemed out of synch with the BCO and CSM and caused you some concerns about the current climate within the brigade.

You remember just three short years ago, the 56th ABCT was considered among the best maneuver brigades in Forces Command. By all measurements, the brigade excelled. Morale across the brigade was high, as it seemed the brigade attracted the best of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps. Leaders wanted to lead, Soldiers wanted to soldier, and a supportive family atmosphere existed among the battalions. There was a strong work ethic. Problems existed, but there was a prevailing attitude that all could be resolved. More often than not, the problems were solved at lower levels and rarely reached the brigade command level. Competition within the brigade existed, but it was positively oriented toward the success of the brigade. Frequent coordination occurred among peers to share information, resources, and lessons learned. Often, the brigade and battalion officers would meet informally for happy-hour type social events. Although these were definitely social occasions, the leaders could not help but discuss ways to improve their brigade. Leaders shared information freely with little regard for ownership or competitiveness. Often, the battalion and brigade commanders were active participants. Brigade officers were often ridiculed by their peers in the division as “whackos” who always wanted to discuss “work” issues. A similar environment existed among the battalion and brigade NCOs. Now it appears the environment has changed and the battalions are competing not to improve the brigade, but to make themselves distinct from the brigade. Camaraderie amongst the outgoing battalion commanders and command sergeant’s major appears to be only skin deep. You are concerned this is due to the environment set by the BCT command team.

Just prior to your departure as a task force senior trainer at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany, the 56th ABCT received notification its deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan and the deployment would be 15 rather than 12 months long. As a battalion commander, you took pride as you observed all leaders pitching in to “make it happen.” Although some officers, non-commissioned officers, Soldiers, and families voiced concerns about the impact the deployment’s length and the significant change in operating environment could have on the brigade, all were committed to making the transition occur as smoothly as possible. Soon after the notification and your departure, the brigade experienced a change of command. The new brigade leadership team assumed responsibility for the predeployment train-up period. Your remaining brigade contacts indicated the transition and train-up seemed to go as well as could be expected. The 56th completed its Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE) at the National Training Center and deployed for war.

While the majority of the brigade took block leave over the last month, you had the opportunity to review a number of historical documents, attend routine battle rhythm events, speak with members of the brigade, and walk around the brigade’s footprint.

Your review of the brigade’s historical unit status reports indicates the 56th ABCT completed all necessary training and received its required equipment prior to departure. The ABCT deployed at 92 percent strength although the assigned strength was 105 percent. The commander’s comments specifically highlighted that brigade leaders and Soldiers were well-trained and qualified. The majority of the non-deployable Soldiers remained at home station for medical reasons that came to light within 60 to 90 days prior to the departure date. During the deployment, the brigade redeployed more than 100 Soldiers for non-combat-related medical problems. While the installation’s medical providers addressed many of the non-deployers’ medical concerns, a significant number of non-deployable Soldiers remain on unit roles. Additionally, since returning, the number of medical non-deployable soldiers has slightly increased above pre-deployment numbers.

The brigade’s historical records from Afghanistan reveal the unit was fairly successful in accomplishing all missions. The documents suggested violence in the 56th’s sector did not significantly increase, nor did it decrease, and casualties in Afghanistan were considered light with one critical exception. Security of the populace and US forces was a major priority that was accomplished very well, but the records indicated the ABCT’s ability to support the host nation was mixed, with limited success in training Afghan Army units and police forces. It appeared the ABCT staff was able to manage day-to-day operations effectively, but struggled with their ability to capitalize on opportunities and to anticipate potential threats.

Approximately five months into the brigade’s fifteen-month deployment, a suicide vehicle-borne IED attacked a patrol in one of the maneuver battalion’s sector. The attack killed the brigade commander, brigade command sergeant major, and one of the battalion commanders as well as wounded several other Soldiers and Afghan Security Forces. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, LTC (P) Mills assumed command of the brigade until the arrival of COL Timmons and CSM Rose. The division headquarters assigned LTC Hendrix, a battalion command-selectee already with the brigade, to assume battalion command.

Another document you reviewed was a comprehensive report with the findings of a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) study conducted for the 56th in Afghanistan. From all accounts, the ABCT performed as well as possible in Afghanistan, and the leadership performed well given the circumstances. However, the official record also indicated significant challenges requiring attention. The extensive study identified several specific issues that may have an impact on the BCT’s future effectiveness. You highlighted the following sections of the report.

Multiple and often incompatible communications systems hampered command and control throughout the brigade. At battalion and below levels, the varying battlefield, electronic, and environmental conditions required leaders to carry multiple radios to communicate effectively. Further, the dispersed nature of multiple combat outposts and Joint Security Stations created significant digital network challenges for the brigade’s network technicians. The digital network frequently crashed making communication loss between the brigade and subordinate battalion headquarters a normal, if not daily, occurrence. While tactical satellite and high frequency radios provided some redundancy, the limited number of systems and frequencies available to the brigade in some cases created operational and personal friction.

Personnel authorizations on the battalion staffs were not sufficient to allow 24-hour operations over a sustained period. Often, battle captains were taken “out of hide” to conduct the mission, resulting in unqualified and untrained personnel attempting to perform battalion tactical operations center functions, especially during the evening hours. This contributed to increased friction between the brigade and battalion staffs.

During the brigade’s deployment, the DCO was tasked at different times to supervise the MiTTs operating within the brigade’s battlespace, synchronize the operations of the brigade support battalion at a different forward operating base, be the “voice” of the ABCT to the media, LNO to coalition forces, and act as a BCT chief of staff. These varied missions for the DCO created confusion within the brigade, and this confusion created the perception of a weakened ABCT command structure. This perception was strengthened when COL Timmons assumed command but left many of the responsibilities for daily operations with the DCO.

The modular BCT structure, first implemented during your time as a battalion commander, continued to create training challenges, especially within the combined arms battalions. Whereas previously the maneuver battalion commanders and staffs were able to focus on traditional infantry and armor skills (e.g., Bradley and tank gunnery, individual infantry and armor soldier skills, infantry and armor platoon skills), the same commanders and staffs were required to attain and maintain proficiency at planning and executing individual and collective skills in areas outside their areas of expertise. Moreover, the report identified subject-matter expertise, once resident within the maneuver battalions, was diminished within the maneuver battalions. The impact of this additional complexity and burden was identified at all levels of leadership. The Army’s decision to augment the brigade with three MiTTs just prior to the MRE required the leaders to rethink combat organization. The BCT never quite compensated for this additional mission even after COL Timmons, who had MiTT experience, arrived to take command. The strain between the MiTT mission and the combat role of the BCT was known throughout the BCT and the division staff.

The Afghanistan environment placed severe demands upon available manpower. Specifically, the need to protect the population and expand operations in previously unsecured areas increased the need for infantry squads. As a result, armor, engineer, artillery, and other Soldiers filled the void performing typical infantry tasks and not their own military occupational specialty core competencies. Soldiers from the forward support companies also augmented maneuver platoons as vehicle drivers and as alternate quick reaction forces within the maneuver battalions.

The 56th ABCT trained for the wrong mission-essential tasks during its training ramp-up for deployment to Afghanistan. The brigade trained exclusively on their assigned M1 Abrams, M2 Bradley combat platforms (focusing on gunnery skills and qualification) prior to deployment and during stability operations. However, upon arrival in theater, operational necessity required use of seven different mine-resistant armor protected variant vehicles in lieu of tanks, Bradleys, and up-armored HMMWVs. The brigade had few assets available at Bagram Airbase to execute drivers’ training during RSOI, requiring the creation of a driver’s training program to train drivers during the first few months in combat. Further, the number of “patrol sets” required to support the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) affected not only the maneuver units, but the brigade’s special troops battalion (STB) and the brigade support battalion (BSB). The brigade STB was specifically affected due to a lack of critical MTOE authorizations for the battalion staff to support both brigade and battalion operations. The dispersed nature of the battalions required the BSB to spend increased time on the roads resupplying outlying locations. Lastly, during pre-deployment train-up, the artillery battalion provided indirect fire support for the cavalry squadron and combined arms battalions’ tank and Bradley platoon qualification tables. The six months dedicated to supporting this mission, including both an internal artillery gunnery certification program and the direct support to maneuver platoons, limited the amount of time available at the platoon and battery level to train on dismounted infantry and patrolling skills.

The stability operations mission created unique issues for the 56th ABCT. Although the size of the ABCT staff had a positive effect on shaping operations within their battlespace, the additional tasks associated with resourcing and supporting the MiTTs from members of the BCT staff created a “dual-hatted” staff, which reduced the staff’s effectiveness.

The CALL Report also indicated a potential problem exists within the culture of the organization. The desire to be seen as an elite, highly professional unit led to the development of unit rituals that were generally good natured and helped instill an espirit de corps within the unit. However, the CALL reports contain information that implies some NCOs and junior officers allowed these events to devolve to an extreme degree during the deployment. The report suggests that the events have progressed from espirit building to “sanctioned hazing” according to one junior NCO.

You also received a 360-degree commander and staff assessment of the 56th ABCT from the Center for Army Leadership’s Leadership Assessment and Feedback Program. A summary of trends from the assessment indicates that the staff had the trust and confidence of the subordinate units. It revealed the NCOs display confidence in their abilities and have a good tactical and technical knowledge. On the other hand, the assessment revealed that commanders shared a lack of willingness to include subordinates in decision-making, and they fell short of expectations on developing subordinates, coaching, and counseling. This is apparently driven by a seeming lack of concern for leader-development by the brigade commander. The report indicates company commanders are not routinely counseled on their performance and receive little to no developmental guidance from either their rater or senior rater.

Recently the BCT HQ completed a command climate survey. There are some inconsistencies in the survey report. Many of the Soldiers within the HQ seem to like being a member of the BCT but report they are stressed because of the upcoming deployment and the effect they anticipate on their families. In addition, there is clearly some disappointment with the leaders in the BCT indicated by comments like, “COL Timmons tells us in formations to take care of our families but he never gives us time to do the things we need to do for them. My wife is really fed up with this unit.” Another comment reads, “MAJ Wilson (brigade S4) is always talking to the female soldiers. I can tell he makes them uncomfortable by the amount of attention he pays them. There are some that he even goes out of his way to get into his office. I think it is affecting the performance of the section but what can I do, I am only a specialist.” You can find no indication that any action was taken by the BCT leadership on the issues within the survey.

The last historical document you reviewed was the brigade’s RESET plan and timeline. A careful study of the document reveals the brigade is currently at R+55. According to the DA G3/5/7 RESET EXORD for the brigade’s redeployment, the brigade has another 125 days in the “RESET” Force Pool before transitioning to the “Train/Ready” Force Pool. Of immediate concern is the pending arrival of the unit’s containers and redeploying equipment not turned in to Army Material Command (AMC) in Afghanistan. The ship arrived at the port ten days ago and immediately began downloading equipment to rail back to home station. Equipment is expected to start arriving and be complete over the next two weeks. Of critical importance is the turn in of ancillary equipment (NBC, NVGs, and radios) to the Special Repair Teams beginning in ten days. The Special Repair Teams are expected to keep the brigade’s equipment for the next 4 to 6 weeks to complete technical inspections and repair.

You attended the AMC ARFORGEN synchronization conference last week for the ABCT. This included representatives from FORSCOM, Department of the Army G1, G3/5/7, G4, G8, AMC, and the division staff primaries. You learned from the PM ABCT representative that because the brigade turned in all of its combat platforms (tanks, Bradleys, M113s, Paladins, and TOC equipment) at Bagram during redeployment, you will not receive your new issue for at least another 90 days. Further, PM TOC told you the brigade will receive all new TOC equipment (tracks, tentage, and C2 systems), but he did not think the equipment would be ready until another 85 days. The CECOM representative also provided less than optimistic information regarding RESET of the brigade’s satellite communication packages. Because the brigade chose to forego much-needed system upgrades prior to the last deployment, the majority of the components on the existing satellite trailers are out of date and no longer under warranty. Additionally, the Army is fielding new communication trailer systems over the next three quarters of the fiscal year with the brigades not scheduled for delivery until just before R+180. Lastly, the AMC representative informed you the ancillary equipment (wheeled vehicles, trailers, water buffalos, MHE, etc.) the brigade turned into AMC prior to the deployment as left behind equipment will be ready for reissue over a 7-week period beginning at R+80.

While the information provided at the conference seemed pretty grim, the division chief of staff, who attended the final outbrief, pledged to both COL Timmons and you he would remain on top of the division G4 and G8 to ensure program managers and AMC upheld their end of the RESET agreement and returned equipment to the brigade as soon as possible.

The manning section of the RESET plan looked optimistic. The brigade was just about to end the DA mandated 60-day stabilization window and begin shedding people as they PCSd to new assignments or ETSd out of the Army. Most significantly, the change of command ceremonies for five of the brigade’s battalions will occur in the next two weeks. LTC Hendrix, commander for one of the combined arms battalions, and COL Timmons, will remain in command for at least the next 12 months. On a positive note, about half of the field grade officers in the battalions will remain in the brigade because they deployed late after completing CGSOC or their division staff time. The battalion XOs all appear competent and have a good understanding of their battalions’ strengths and weaknesses and brigade-level systems. The brigade did receive some replacement personnel during the deployment, and can expect HRC to fill the brigade at 80 percent available strength overall and 75 percent senior grade during the RESET window.

Major Wilson is the brigade S4. The S4 section performed poorly during the last deployment. While MAJ Wilson appears to be a good officer who knows the technical aspects of supply and maintenance management, he suffers from a lack of understanding of how to run his staff. Many of the brigade leaders view his section as lacking commitment to the ideas and direction of the brigade commander. The battalion commanders note that the S4 section can meet critical supply efforts to support operations, but struggles with the myriad of garrison procedures and inspections. The S4 section has conflict with the division G4 that has lead to an adversarial relationship. The soldiers in the section seem unmotivated and have a general lack of discipline across the group.

Major Springsteen, the brigade’s S6, appeared to be the least likely officer to complain about workload. However, last week after a particularly stressful staff meeting, he commented, “Sir, I know you are busy, but I have to talk to someone. I’m not sure how much more of this I can take. Nothing we do on this staff seems to be good enough and staffing actions never seem to get the time they deserve. We’re not allowed to make routine decisions at our level, and it seems we jump from one crisis to another with no apparent vision. I thought when we returned from Afghanistan the pace would improve a bit, at least for a short while, and allow me to once again get acquainted with my family. It has been far from that! I even had my leave shortened to support the division command post exercise. A division CPX for crying out loud! We just returned from combat! We were told the division’s new staff needed to resolve some internal staffing procedures, so they scheduled an out-of-cycle training exercise. Given this division’s 24/7 mentality and helter-skelter attitude, I would almost rather be back in Afghanistan. At least there everyone knows they have to work 24/7, and no one really expects to know what will happen next. Plus, you don’t have the family wondering why Daddy isn’t home. Even my wife, who basically ran the brigade’s family readiness group (FRG) when we were deployed and is a very dedicated Army wife, is about to throw in the towel.”

Last week, you witnessed an exchange at a BCT command team meeting. The commander and command sergeant major of one of the brigade’s combined arms battalions provided COL Timmons and CSM Rose a detailed review of the effect of the installation’s “red cycle” on their unit training plans, receipt of equipment and execution of the reset of personnel and equipment, reestablish garrison systems, and leader and incoming Soldier training to address shortfalls identified in Afghanistan. The battalion commander stated, “We’re caught between a rock and a hard place because we tell Soldiers to reconnect with their families after being away for fifteen months, then pile so many competing requirements on the plate they have to work until 1900 hours each night to meet suspenses. When you add on red-cycle taskings, the problem increases because you have fewer Soldiers to do the same amount of work. When I have to defer equipment turn-in for two weeks or keep Soldiers late telling them it’s more important to guard motor pools and ranges than recover our equipment from war, we all lose credibility. Soldiers know the difference between activity to keep them alive, and make-work.”

The battalion CSM added, “This is worse than I’ve ever seen it. It seems we cannot catch a break on the ever-increasing extra duties and work details. When I mentioned this to the division CSM at his last senior NCO call, he dismissed me by saying, ‘we have had red cycles throughout my 26 years in the Army. They’ll always be here, so live with it. Quit complaining! You guys have been nothing but whiners since you returned from Afghanistan!’”

The response of COL Timmons to both of his subordinate leaders was telling. He responded with, “Commander, you have to figure it out! Nothing is coming off the plate. Do not expect me or my sergeant major to plead your case with the division. This is life! Meet the mission!”

Your experiences with the officers in the brigade S3 shop were positive. All appeared professional, cooperative, and well-motivated by LTC Fogarty. However, recent comments to you by two battalion S3s indicated a dictatorial side to the brigade S3. They mentioned Fogarty’s unwillingness to consider new ways of approaching the diverse training needs brought by the reconfiguration. Moreover, Fogarty indicated if they took their concerns to their battalion commanders (one of whom was fairly new) they would regret it. When you mentioned this to LTC (P) Mills, he stated, “Hell, that’s just Fogarty flexing his muscle. There’s no better brigade S3 in the division, and everyone knows it. Those battalion officers need to quit sniveling and get to work.”

As you moved throughout the brigade, you perceived an undercurrent of discussion that centers on a potential incident of sexual harassment within the brigade between an officer and a soldier. The conversation centers around one of the “superstar” company commanders within the brigade, CPT Cooper. As a platoon leader, he was in charge of the PSD for COL Timmons. After the deployment, COL Timmons placed CPT Cooper in command ahead of other senior captains that were waiting for command. While these are troubling discussions, you assume they are formed from jealousy among the other officers in the brigade. You recall your initial conversations with the DCO and begin to wonder about the depth of the apparent positive command climate within the 56th ABCT. When you mention what you heard to LTC (P) Mills he avoids the question and changes the topic of discussion to a number of late personnel actions from the S1.

In a private conversation last week, CSM Rose mentioned “I’m worried about my senior NCOs. They appear competent, but I don’t see any results from their work. There appears to be little teamwork among themselves and their officers. When I ask them why they don’t speak up and get involved, they ask, ‘Why should I? Nothing ever comes of it. Our officers are only concerned about themselves, not the unit.’”

You have also found out the BCT is experiencing a growing trend in three negative areas: domestic abuse, DUI, and divorces. The increases are across all battalions as well as the HQ. The reports are a strong indicator of the increased stress across the BCT. While the BCT commander put policies in place to ensure immediate reporting of both abuse and DUI cases there is no plan for prevention. The BCT seems to be in a react mode in these areas. Your discussions with the BCT chaplain confirm the increase in divorces. He mentions to you the reason appears to be marital unfaithfulness during the last deployment and a continued OPTEMPO that is causing the spouse at home to feel alone and without hope. He also indicates he believes most of the issues with infidelity are internal to the brigade with a few cases among the senior members of the brigade staff that are still on-going. Col Timmons’s response to the chaplain’s concern about these allegations was simply, “Those are only rumors. Don’t bring me that stuff without proof!”

Finally, your informal conversations with friends within the division suggest the 56th gained a reputation in Afghanistan for being very “heavy-handed” in dealing with locals While the characterization started during the initial relief-in-place/transition of authority their behavior took a marked downturn after the death of the brigade command team and battalion commander. According to several sources outside the brigade, this approach appeared to inhibit the brigade’s ability to conduct host-nation responsibilities. One of your more trusted sources stated emphatically, “Mills’s negative attitude of the Afghanis created a cancer among some within the brigade, and it’s still there. COL Timmons only made things worse with his hyperbole and force oriented approach to the security in the BCT AO. You need to be very careful.”

The past few weeks have been a blur for you. You understand the brigade has undergone numerous changes and know significant challenges lie ahead. Fortunately, the information you received from historical records, CALL and CAL assessments, and conversations and observations with leaders throughout the brigade and division provided some much-needed information. COL Timmons knows there is not much time before the brigade will be back in the rotation for deployment and he appears nervous about preparing for a return to the same area. You are scheduled for a meeting with the brigade commander to provide your assessment of the brigade’s status and to chart a course for the next few months. Your major concern is where to start.
One Week Later

Situation:

You are the deputy brigade commander, LTC (P) Osborne. At 22:00 hours yesterday the division secretary of the general staff called and asked you to report to the division commander’s office immediately. Upon your arrival, the division commander informed you he has lost confidence in COL Timmons’s ability to command effectively. He also informed you that you would immediately take command of the brigade.

As you leave the meeting with the division commander, you know you need to identify the significant challenges you see within the brigade, the processes you might use to improve the brigade, and how you will know you are successful in improving the brigade.
Requirement:

You will answer the L100 exam (in the form of an essay) related to this case study and the situation described above. You MUST integrate concepts from L100 into your responses. The L100 exam contains the specific instructions and grading criteria.

Developing Organizations and Leaders/“The 56th Armored Brigade Combat Team”

Requirement: This is your end-of-block exam for L100. The purpose of this assessment is for you to demonstrate your achievement of the TLO for L100. The TLO for L100 is, “Explain how field grade officers lead in the development of organizations and leaders to achieve results.”
This exam is based on the 56th Armor Brigade Combat Team case study and the L100 learning objectives. The L100 exam case study is available to you in a separate document. You will answer the questions from the perspective of the new brigade commander, LTC (P) Osborne.

You will synthesize the organizational development processes you learned from the L100 lessons (specifically L101-L109) and apply them to a problem. The assessment rubric for the exam is listed below on page two and provides the grading criteria for the exam question. Ensure you address the specified criteria when formulating your response. Ensure you write your response as an essay.

The L100 exam requires you to write your essay in first person to take personal credit for your leadership knowledge, skills, and abilities. Your answer will be no less than four (4) pages and no more than five (5) pages in length (double-spaced, using 12-point Times New Roman Font, and one-inch margins). Your completed essay is due at the end of the block, after lesson L111. The L100 exam is worth 60% of the L100 block grade.

In addition to the case study, you MUST integrate concepts from L100 into your responses. Specifically, you should use some of the models or theories discussed in L100 as you answer your exam. However, do NOT regurgitate the process or model; instead, explain how you will use the process or model applied to the exam case study. Finally, you do not have to submit a CGSC Form 1009w writing evaluation for this assignment.

Always cite your sources. If something is not your original thought, you need to cite your source using either footnotes or endnotes IAW the Turabian style of documentation; do not use parenthetical citations. This includes direct quotations, paraphrases, and summaries of the assigned readings, doctrinal references, or outside sources. You may use the L100 online lessons, readings, and reference materials to help you prepare your assignment. You also may use ST 22-2 as a reference for writing.

ALL work must be your own. You may NOT discuss this exam with any other person except your DDE academic advisor or faculty member. Another person may proofread your paper for correctness and clarity only; however, this person may not be a current or former CGSOC student. You must list this person as a reference in your footnotes or endnotes.

CGSC does not tolerate cheating, plagiarism, or unauthorized collaboration. Therefore, you should review CGSC Bulletin #920, Academic Ethics Policy (February 2011) and the DDE Academic Ethics brief posted on the course information page. Violation of academic ethics will result in an investigation and possible removal from the course.

Questions

Using concepts from L100, what is the critical leadership problem facing the 56th ABCT? How will you use the processes and concepts from L100 to improve the ABCT and achieve your vision? Clearly and comprehensively, explain, defend and justify your answers.
Assessment Rubric
Evaluative Criteria (90 Points)
Score

Apply critical-thinking skills to identify, explain, and defend the selection of the critical leadership problem. Use relevant facts and assumptions from the 56th ABCT case study to support your argument. (30 Points)

Describe your vision for the brigade. (10 Points)

Applying concepts and processes from L100, describe how you will solve the problem, implement your vision and how you will measure effectiveness in achieving your vision. (50 Points) 1
Communication Criteria (10 Points)

The introduction clearly states the thesis and introduces major points.

Major points are fully developed using clear reasoning.

The conclusion reinforces the thesis and major points.

Style is concise, primarily in active voice, and generally free of errors in grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

Proper use of citations IAW ST 22-2.

US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
L100: Developing Organizations and Leaders

L100 Exam Case Study
AY 13-14
“The 56th Armored Brigade Combat Team”

You are LTC Osborne a promotable lieutenant colonel who commanded a battalion in the 56th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). One month ago, you returned to the 56th ABCT after a 2 ½-year absence to assume the deputy brigade commander’s (DCO) position. While you are excited about getting reacquainted and acclimated with your old unit, you know a lot has happened, including a deployment, in your absence.

The 56th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) returned from Afghanistan 55 days ago and is now in its RESET phase of the ARFORGEN process. The 56th’s parent division headquarters and the other divisional BCTs did not deploy with the brigade. Instead, the 56th ABCT worked for two other divisions during their deployment and with a number of other BCTs. Further, due to operational needs and capability shortfalls in another brigade, the 56th detached one of its combined arms battalions for thirteen of the deployment’s fifteen months. The brigade has been back at home station for almost two months; reintegration training and block leave are complete. As you settle into your new position and surroundings, you realize that few, if any, of the ABCT staff remains from your last tour with the unit. Further, many of the current ABCT staff will PCS in the next few months. The change of command for five of the battalions is scheduled in the next 30 days. Your initial conversations with COL Timmons, the brigade commander (BCO) and CSM Rose, the brigade command sergeant major, were positive. Both appear to have genuine concerns about the actions needed to improve the brigade and prepare it for the next mission. Your discussions with LTC (P) Mills, the outgoing deputy brigade commander (DCO), seemed out of synch with the BCO and CSM and caused you some concerns about the current climate within the brigade.

You remember just three short years ago, the 56th ABCT was considered among the best maneuver brigades in Forces Command. By all measurements, the brigade excelled. Morale across the brigade was high, as it seemed the brigade attracted the best of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps. Leaders wanted to lead, Soldiers wanted to soldier, and a supportive family atmosphere existed among the battalions. There was a strong work ethic. Problems existed, but there was a prevailing attitude that all could be resolved. More often than not, the problems were solved at lower levels and rarely reached the brigade command level. Competition within the brigade existed, but it was positively oriented toward the success of the brigade. Frequent coordination occurred among peers to share information, resources, and lessons learned. Often, the brigade and battalion officers would meet informally for happy-hour type social events. Although these were definitely social occasions, the leaders could not help but discuss ways to improve their brigade. Leaders shared information freely with little regard for ownership or competitiveness. Often, the battalion and brigade commanders were active participants. Brigade officers were often ridiculed by their peers in the division as “whackos” who always wanted to discuss “work” issues. A similar environment existed among the battalion and brigade NCOs. Now it appears the environment has changed and the battalions are competing not to improve the brigade, but to make themselves distinct from the brigade. Camaraderie amongst the outgoing battalion commanders and command sergeant’s major appears to be only skin deep. You are concerned this is due to the environment set by the BCT command team.

Just prior to your departure as a task force senior trainer at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany, the 56th ABCT received notification its deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan and the deployment would be 15 rather than 12 months long. As a battalion commander, you took pride as you observed all leaders pitching in to “make it happen.” Although some officers, non-commissioned officers, Soldiers, and families voiced concerns about the impact the deployment’s length and the significant change in operating environment could have on the brigade, all were committed to making the transition occur as smoothly as possible. Soon after the notification and your departure, the brigade experienced a change of command. The new brigade leadership team assumed responsibility for the predeployment train-up period. Your remaining brigade contacts indicated the transition and train-up seemed to go as well as could be expected. The 56th completed its Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE) at the National Training Center and deployed for war.

While the majority of the brigade took block leave over the last month, you had the opportunity to review a number of historical documents, attend routine battle rhythm events, speak with members of the brigade, and walk around the brigade’s footprint.

Your review of the brigade’s historical unit status reports indicates the 56th ABCT completed all necessary training and received its required equipment prior to departure. The ABCT deployed at 92 percent strength although the assigned strength was 105 percent. The commander’s comments specifically highlighted that brigade leaders and Soldiers were well-trained and qualified. The majority of the non-deployable Soldiers remained at home station for medical reasons that came to light within 60 to 90 days prior to the departure date. During the deployment, the brigade redeployed more than 100 Soldiers for non-combat-related medical problems. While the installation’s medical providers addressed many of the non-deployers’ medical concerns, a significant number of non-deployable Soldiers remain on unit roles. Additionally, since returning, the number of medical non-deployable soldiers has slightly increased above pre-deployment numbers.

The brigade’s historical records from Afghanistan reveal the unit was fairly successful in accomplishing all missions. The documents suggested violence in the 56th’s sector did not significantly increase, nor did it decrease, and casualties in Afghanistan were considered light with one critical exception. Security of the populace and US forces was a major priority that was accomplished very well, but the records indicated the ABCT’s ability to support the host nation was mixed, with limited success in training Afghan Army units and police forces. It appeared the ABCT staff was able to manage day-to-day operations effectively, but struggled with their ability to capitalize on opportunities and to anticipate potential threats.

Approximately five months into the brigade’s fifteen-month deployment, a suicide vehicle-borne IED attacked a patrol in one of the maneuver battalion’s sector. The attack killed the brigade commander, brigade command sergeant major, and one of the battalion commanders as well as wounded several other Soldiers and Afghan Security Forces. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, LTC (P) Mills assumed command of the brigade until the arrival of COL Timmons and CSM Rose. The division headquarters assigned LTC Hendrix, a battalion command-selectee already with the brigade, to assume battalion command.

Another document you reviewed was a comprehensive report with the findings of a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) study conducted for the 56th in Afghanistan. From all accounts, the ABCT performed as well as possible in Afghanistan, and the leadership performed well given the circumstances. However, the official record also indicated significant challenges requiring attention. The extensive study identified several specific issues that may have an impact on the BCT’s future effectiveness. You highlighted the following sections of the report.

Multiple and often incompatible communications systems hampered command and control throughout the brigade. At battalion and below levels, the varying battlefield, electronic, and environmental conditions required leaders to carry multiple radios to communicate effectively. Further, the dispersed nature of multiple combat outposts and Joint Security Stations created significant digital network challenges for the brigade’s network technicians. The digital network frequently crashed making communication loss between the brigade and subordinate battalion headquarters a normal, if not daily, occurrence. While tactical satellite and high frequency radios provided some redundancy, the limited number of systems and frequencies available to the brigade in some cases created operational and personal friction.

Personnel authorizations on the battalion staffs were not sufficient to allow 24-hour operations over a sustained period. Often, battle captains were taken “out of hide” to conduct the mission, resulting in unqualified and untrained personnel attempting to perform battalion tactical operations center functions, especially during the evening hours. This contributed to increased friction between the brigade and battalion staffs.

During the brigade’s deployment, the DCO was tasked at different times to supervise the MiTTs operating within the brigade’s battlespace, synchronize the operations of the brigade support battalion at a different forward operating base, be the “voice” of the ABCT to the media, LNO to coalition forces, and act as a BCT chief of staff. These varied missions for the DCO created confusion within the brigade, and this confusion created the perception of a weakened ABCT command structure. This perception was strengthened when COL Timmons assumed command but left many of the responsibilities for daily operations with the DCO.

The modular BCT structure, first implemented during your time as a battalion commander, continued to create training challenges, especially within the combined arms battalions. Whereas previously the maneuver battalion commanders and staffs were able to focus on traditional infantry and armor skills (e.g., Bradley and tank gunnery, individual infantry and armor soldier skills, infantry and armor platoon skills), the same commanders and staffs were required to attain and maintain proficiency at planning and executing individual and collective skills in areas outside their areas of expertise. Moreover, the report identified subject-matter expertise, once resident within the maneuver battalions, was diminished within the maneuver battalions. The impact of this additional complexity and burden was identified at all levels of leadership. The Army’s decision to augment the brigade with three MiTTs just prior to the MRE required the leaders to rethink combat organization. The BCT never quite compensated for this additional mission even after COL Timmons, who had MiTT experience, arrived to take command. The strain between the MiTT mission and the combat role of the BCT was known throughout the BCT and the division staff.

The Afghanistan environment placed severe demands upon available manpower. Specifically, the need to protect the population and expand operations in previously unsecured areas increased the need for infantry squads. As a result, armor, engineer, artillery, and other Soldiers filled the void performing typical infantry tasks and not their own military occupational specialty core competencies. Soldiers from the forward support companies also augmented maneuver platoons as vehicle drivers and as alternate quick reaction forces within the maneuver battalions.

The 56th ABCT trained for the wrong mission-essential tasks during its training ramp-up for deployment to Afghanistan. The brigade trained exclusively on their assigned M1 Abrams, M2 Bradley combat platforms (focusing on gunnery skills and qualification) prior to deployment and during stability operations. However, upon arrival in theater, operational necessity required use of seven different mine-resistant armor protected variant vehicles in lieu of tanks, Bradleys, and up-armored HMMWVs. The brigade had few assets available at Bagram Airbase to execute drivers’ training during RSOI, requiring the creation of a driver’s training program to train drivers during the first few months in combat. Further, the number of “patrol sets” required to support the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) affected not only the maneuver units, but the brigade’s special troops battalion (STB) and the brigade support battalion (BSB). The brigade STB was specifically affected due to a lack of critical MTOE authorizations for the battalion staff to support both brigade and battalion operations. The dispersed nature of the battalions required the BSB to spend increased time on the roads resupplying outlying locations. Lastly, during pre-deployment train-up, the artillery battalion provided indirect fire support for the cavalry squadron and combined arms battalions’ tank and Bradley platoon qualification tables. The six months dedicated to supporting this mission, including both an internal artillery gunnery certification program and the direct support to maneuver platoons, limited the amount of time available at the platoon and battery level to train on dismounted infantry and patrolling skills.

The stability operations mission created unique issues for the 56th ABCT. Although the size of the ABCT staff had a positive effect on shaping operations within their battlespace, the additional tasks associated with resourcing and supporting the MiTTs from members of the BCT staff created a “dual-hatted” staff, which reduced the staff’s effectiveness.

The CALL Report also indicated a potential problem exists within the culture of the organization. The desire to be seen as an elite, highly professional unit led to the development of unit rituals that were generally good natured and helped instill an espirit de corps within the unit. However, the CALL reports contain information that implies some NCOs and junior officers allowed these events to devolve to an extreme degree during the deployment. The report suggests that the events have progressed from espirit building to “sanctioned hazing” according to one junior NCO.

You also received a 360-degree commander and staff assessment of the 56th ABCT from the Center for Army Leadership’s Leadership Assessment and Feedback Program. A summary of trends from the assessment indicates that the staff had the trust and confidence of the subordinate units. It revealed the NCOs display confidence in their abilities and have a good tactical and technical knowledge. On the other hand, the assessment revealed that commanders shared a lack of willingness to include subordinates in decision-making, and they fell short of expectations on developing subordinates, coaching, and counseling. This is apparently driven by a seeming lack of concern for leader-development by the brigade commander. The report indicates company commanders are not routinely counseled on their performance and receive little to no developmental guidance from either their rater or senior rater.

Recently the BCT HQ completed a command climate survey. There are some inconsistencies in the survey report. Many of the Soldiers within the HQ seem to like being a member of the BCT but report they are stressed because of the upcoming deployment and the effect they anticipate on their families. In addition, there is clearly some disappointment with the leaders in the BCT indicated by comments like, “COL Timmons tells us in formations to take care of our families but he never gives us time to do the things we need to do for them. My wife is really fed up with this unit.” Another comment reads, “MAJ Wilson (brigade S4) is always talking to the female soldiers. I can tell he makes them uncomfortable by the amount of attention he pays them. There are some that he even goes out of his way to get into his office. I think it is affecting the performance of the section but what can I do, I am only a specialist.” You can find no indication that any action was taken by the BCT leadership on the issues within the survey.

The last historical document you reviewed was the brigade’s RESET plan and timeline. A careful study of the document reveals the brigade is currently at R+55. According to the DA G3/5/7 RESET EXORD for the brigade’s redeployment, the brigade has another 125 days in the “RESET” Force Pool before transitioning to the “Train/Ready” Force Pool. Of immediate concern is the pending arrival of the unit’s containers and redeploying equipment not turned in to Army Material Command (AMC) in Afghanistan. The ship arrived at the port ten days ago and immediately began downloading equipment to rail back to home station. Equipment is expected to start arriving and be complete over the next two weeks. Of critical importance is the turn in of ancillary equipment (NBC, NVGs, and radios) to the Special Repair Teams beginning in ten days. The Special Repair Teams are expected to keep the brigade’s equipment for the next 4 to 6 weeks to complete technical inspections and repair.

You attended the AMC ARFORGEN synchronization conference last week for the ABCT. This included representatives from FORSCOM, Department of the Army G1, G3/5/7, G4, G8, AMC, and the division staff primaries. You learned from the PM ABCT representative that because the brigade turned in all of its combat platforms (tanks, Bradleys, M113s, Paladins, and TOC equipment) at Bagram during redeployment, you will not receive your new issue for at least another 90 days. Further, PM TOC told you the brigade will receive all new TOC equipment (tracks, tentage, and C2 systems), but he did not think the equipment would be ready until another 85 days. The CECOM representative also provided less than optimistic information regarding RESET of the brigade’s satellite communication packages. Because the brigade chose to forego much-needed system upgrades prior to the last deployment, the majority of the components on the existing satellite trailers are out of date and no longer under warranty. Additionally, the Army is fielding new communication trailer systems over the next three quarters of the fiscal year with the brigades not scheduled for delivery until just before R+180. Lastly, the AMC representative informed you the ancillary equipment (wheeled vehicles, trailers, water buffalos, MHE, etc.) the brigade turned into AMC prior to the deployment as left behind equipment will be ready for reissue over a 7-week period beginning at R+80.

While the information provided at the conference seemed pretty grim, the division chief of staff, who attended the final outbrief, pledged to both COL Timmons and you he would remain on top of the division G4 and G8 to ensure program managers and AMC upheld their end of the RESET agreement and returned equipment to the brigade as soon as possible.

The manning section of the RESET plan looked optimistic. The brigade was just about to end the DA mandated 60-day stabilization window and begin shedding people as they PCSd to new assignments or ETSd out of the Army. Most significantly, the change of command ceremonies for five of the brigade’s battalions will occur in the next two weeks. LTC Hendrix, commander for one of the combined arms battalions, and COL Timmons, will remain in command for at least the next 12 months. On a positive note, about half of the field grade officers in the battalions will remain in the brigade because they deployed late after completing CGSOC or their division staff time. The battalion XOs all appear competent and have a good understanding of their battalions’ strengths and weaknesses and brigade-level systems. The brigade did receive some replacement personnel during the deployment, and can expect HRC to fill the brigade at 80 percent available strength overall and 75 percent senior grade during the RESET window.

Major Wilson is the brigade S4. The S4 section performed poorly during the last deployment. While MAJ Wilson appears to be a good officer who knows the technical aspects of supply and maintenance management, he suffers from a lack of understanding of how to run his staff. Many of the brigade leaders view his section as lacking commitment to the ideas and direction of the brigade commander. The battalion commanders note that the S4 section can meet critical supply efforts to support operations, but struggles with the myriad of garrison procedures and inspections. The S4 section has conflict with the division G4 that has lead to an adversarial relationship. The soldiers in the section seem unmotivated and have a general lack of discipline across the group.

Major Springsteen, the brigade’s S6, appeared to be the least likely officer to complain about workload. However, last week after a particularly stressful staff meeting, he commented, “Sir, I know you are busy, but I have to talk to someone. I’m not sure how much more of this I can take. Nothing we do on this staff seems to be good enough and staffing actions never seem to get the time they deserve. We’re not allowed to make routine decisions at our level, and it seems we jump from one crisis to another with no apparent vision. I thought when we returned from Afghanistan the pace would improve a bit, at least for a short while, and allow me to once again get acquainted with my family. It has been far from that! I even had my leave shortened to support the division command post exercise. A division CPX for crying out loud! We just returned from combat! We were told the division’s new staff needed to resolve some internal staffing procedures, so they scheduled an out-of-cycle training exercise. Given this division’s 24/7 mentality and helter-skelter attitude, I would almost rather be back in Afghanistan. At least there everyone knows they have to work 24/7, and no one really expects to know what will happen next. Plus, you don’t have the family wondering why Daddy isn’t home. Even my wife, who basically ran the brigade’s family readiness group (FRG) when we were deployed and is a very dedicated Army wife, is about to throw in the towel.”

Last week, you witnessed an exchange at a BCT command team meeting. The commander and command sergeant major of one of the brigade’s combined arms battalions provided COL Timmons and CSM Rose a detailed review of the effect of the installation’s “red cycle” on their unit training plans, receipt of equipment and execution of the reset of personnel and equipment, reestablish garrison systems, and leader and incoming Soldier training to address shortfalls identified in Afghanistan. The battalion commander stated, “We’re caught between a rock and a hard place because we tell Soldiers to reconnect with their families after being away for fifteen months, then pile so many competing requirements on the plate they have to work until 1900 hours each night to meet suspenses. When you add on red-cycle taskings, the problem increases because you have fewer Soldiers to do the same amount of work. When I have to defer equipment turn-in for two weeks or keep Soldiers late telling them it’s more important to guard motor pools and ranges than recover our equipment from war, we all lose credibility. Soldiers know the difference between activity to keep them alive, and make-work.”

The battalion CSM added, “This is worse than I’ve ever seen it. It seems we cannot catch a break on the ever-increasing extra duties and work details. When I mentioned this to the division CSM at his last senior NCO call, he dismissed me by saying, ‘we have had red cycles throughout my 26 years in the Army. They’ll always be here, so live with it. Quit complaining! You guys have been nothing but whiners since you returned from Afghanistan!’”

The response of COL Timmons to both of his subordinate leaders was telling. He responded with, “Commander, you have to figure it out! Nothing is coming off the plate. Do not expect me or my sergeant major to plead your case with the division. This is life! Meet the mission!”

Your experiences with the officers in the brigade S3 shop were positive. All appeared professional, cooperative, and well-motivated by LTC Fogarty. However, recent comments to you by two battalion S3s indicated a dictatorial side to the brigade S3. They mentioned Fogarty’s unwillingness to consider new ways of approaching the diverse training needs brought by the reconfiguration. Moreover, Fogarty indicated if they took their concerns to their battalion commanders (one of whom was fairly new) they would regret it. When you mentioned this to LTC (P) Mills, he stated, “Hell, that’s just Fogarty flexing his muscle. There’s no better brigade S3 in the division, and everyone knows it. Those battalion officers need to quit sniveling and get to work.”

As you moved throughout the brigade, you perceived an undercurrent of discussion that centers on a potential incident of sexual harassment within the brigade between an officer and a soldier. The conversation centers around one of the “superstar” company commanders within the brigade, CPT Cooper. As a platoon leader, he was in charge of the PSD for COL Timmons. After the deployment, COL Timmons placed CPT Cooper in command ahead of other senior captains that were waiting for command. While these are troubling discussions, you assume they are formed from jealousy among the other officers in the brigade. You recall your initial conversations with the DCO and begin to wonder about the depth of the apparent positive command climate within the 56th ABCT. When you mention what you heard to LTC (P) Mills he avoids the question and changes the topic of discussion to a number of late personnel actions from the S1.

In a private conversation last week, CSM Rose mentioned “I’m worried about my senior NCOs. They appear competent, but I don’t see any results from their work. There appears to be little teamwork among themselves and their officers. When I ask them why they don’t speak up and get involved, they ask, ‘Why should I? Nothing ever comes of it. Our officers are only concerned about themselves, not the unit.’”

You have also found out the BCT is experiencing a growing trend in three negative areas: domestic abuse, DUI, and divorces. The increases are across all battalions as well as the HQ. The reports are a strong indicator of the increased stress across the BCT. While the BCT commander put policies in place to ensure immediate reporting of both abuse and DUI cases there is no plan for prevention. The BCT seems to be in a react mode in these areas. Your discussions with the BCT chaplain confirm the increase in divorces. He mentions to you the reason appears to be marital unfaithfulness during the last deployment and a continued OPTEMPO that is causing the spouse at home to feel alone and without hope. He also indicates he believes most of the issues with infidelity are internal to the brigade with a few cases among the senior members of the brigade staff that are still on-going. Col Timmons’s response to the chaplain’s concern about these allegations was simply, “Those are only rumors. Don’t bring me that stuff without proof!”

Finally, your informal conversations with friends within the division suggest the 56th gained a reputation in Afghanistan for being very “heavy-handed” in dealing with locals While the characterization started during the initial relief-in-place/transition of authority their behavior took a marked downturn after the death of the brigade command team and battalion commander. According to several sources outside the brigade, this approach appeared to inhibit the brigade’s ability to conduct host-nation responsibilities. One of your more trusted sources stated emphatically, “Mills’s negative attitude of the Afghanis created a cancer among some within the brigade, and it’s still there. COL Timmons only made things worse with his hyperbole and force oriented approach to the security in the BCT AO. You need to be very careful.”

The past few weeks have been a blur for you. You understand the brigade has undergone numerous changes and know significant challenges lie ahead. Fortunately, the information you received from historical records, CALL and CAL assessments, and conversations and observations with leaders throughout the brigade and division provided some much-needed information. COL Timmons knows there is not much time before the brigade will be back in the rotation for deployment and he appears nervous about preparing for a return to the same area. You are scheduled for a meeting with the brigade commander to provide your assessment of the brigade’s status and to chart a course for the next few months. Your major concern is where to start.
One Week Later

Situation:

You are the deputy brigade commander, LTC (P) Osborne. At 22:00 hours yesterday the division secretary of the general staff called and asked you to report to the division commander’s office immediately. Upon your arrival, the division commander informed you he has lost confidence in COL Timmons’s ability to command effectively. He also informed you that you would immediately take command of the brigade.

As you leave the meeting with the division commander, you know you need to identify the significant challenges you see within the brigade, the processes you might use to improve the brigade, and how you will know you are successful in improving the brigade.
Requirement:

You will answer the L100 exam (in the form of an essay) related to this case study and the situation described above. You MUST integrate concepts from L100 into your responses. The L100 exam contains the specific instructions and grading criteria.