{"id":29452,"date":"2018-02-20T23:50:30","date_gmt":"2018-02-20T23:50:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/writemyessayfree.com\/review-of-journal-articles-2"},"modified":"2017-08-12T07:43:53","modified_gmt":"2017-08-12T07:43:53","slug":"review-of-journal-articles-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/review-of-journal-articles-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Review of Journal Articles"},"content":{"rendered":"
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\n March 21, 2017<\/time>\n <\/div>\n

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Review of Journal Articles<\/h2>\n

Regarding the reference, you have to use the resource i send to you and plus the resources you find. At least 5 resources for each one. Also, you have to use the theory from the lecture note and indicate the reference from the notes (week number and slides pages). There is no restriction on the theory you choose.
Because it is two separate essay, pls send me seperate reference.<\/p>\n

The two articles are, i send it in the attachment. Regarding the necessary resources, i send to you in the next email. Thx<\/p>\n

1. Alc\u00e1cer, J., & Zhao, M. (2016). Zooming in: A practical manual for identifying geographic<\/p>\n

clusters. Strategic Management Journal, 37(1), 10-21.<\/p>\n

2. Aguilera, R. V., Flores, R., & Kim, J. U. (2015). Re-examining regional borders and the<\/p>\n

multinational enterprise. Multinational Business Review, 23(4), 374-394.
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article 1.pdf(754K)
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article 2.pdf(265K)
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Lecture Notes Week 2.pdf(574K)
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Lecture_ week 1.pdf(2M)
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Lecture_ week 3.pdf(1M)
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Lecture_ week 4.pdf(3M)
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Lecture_ week 5.pdf(2M)
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MGF5966 Assessment Task 2.pdf(191K)
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The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power
By Hugh White
Australia\u2019s future depends on America and China. They are now the world\u2019s two
richest and strongest countries, and they are by far the two most important
countries in the world to us. If they get on well, Asia\u2019s future is bright and
Australia has a good chance of peace and prosperity. If they get on badly, our
future is bleak. Their economies are deeply intertwined, and day-to-day business
between them is generally managed well. But as China\u2019s power grows, there is an
increasing undercurrent of rivalry that raises big questions about their longterm
relationship, and what it means for the future. Will they find a way to live in
peace with each other, or will they become strategic competitors \u2013 even
enemies? Will Asia enjoy many more decades of peace and stability, or will it be
devastated by conflict?
The answers are far from clear. Peace and stability are certainly possible, but the
risk of rivalry and conflict is also quite real. Which it will be depends more than
anything else on choices that will be made over the next few years in Washington
and Beijing. Each country will have to decide how far it is willing to adjust its
ambitions and aspirations to accommodate the other. Either one of them can
push the relationship towards rivalry by asserting its ambitions too ruthlessly.
Only together can they make the mutual concessions needed to pull back
towards cooperation. Both, therefore, share responsibility for avoiding disaster.
This book is about America\u2019s part in that shared responsibility.
The choices for America are quite urgent: Washington and Beijing are already
sliding towards rivalry by default, seeing each other more and more as strategic
competitors. The relationship between the world\u2019s two richest and strongest
states will always be competitive; the question is whether that competition still
allows them to trade and invest with each other, cooperate to solve shared
problems, and contribute to maintain a stable international order.
Competition becomes dangerous when concerns about status and security
become so intense that they preclude cooperation in other areas, and the quest
for political, strategic or military advantage becomes the overriding priority. This
is the path down which America and China are already taking the first steps.
While for the most part their overt language remains cautious, they are building
their forces and adapting their military plans specifically with the other in mind;
seeking support from other Asian countries; and seeing regional questions, like
the South China Sea disputes, more and more through the lens of rivalry.
The further this goes on, the harder it will be to change course and choose
cooperation.
America\u2019s choices about China are among the most important and difficult it has
ever faced. They are important because serious rivalry with China would be very
costly and dangerous, and conflict could be catastrophic. They are difficult
because they touch on deep questions about America\u2019s role in the world, and
therefore about America itself. China raises these questions because, in one
fundamental way, it is different from any country America has ever dealt with: it
is richer and more powerful.
Within a few years China is set to have a larger economy than America, becoming
the first country to do so since America overtook Britain in the 1880s. By midcentury,
on some estimates, China\u2019s GDP could be double America\u2019s.
China\u2019s wealth changes America\u2019s relationship with it because the old saying is
right: ultimately, wealth is power. America itself has shown this to be true, with
its global power built on its economic preponderance. Now China\u2019s swift
economic rise is driving a rapid shift in relative strategic and political power.
China still lags well behind America on many measures, but in almost every case
the long-term trends are going its way. China does not even need to overtake
America to pose a very serious challenge: its economy is already larger relative
to America\u2019s than the Soviet Union\u2019s ever was. That makes China, in the long run,
more formidable than the Soviets were at the height of the Cold War. And in Asia,
where Chinese and American power meet, China enjoys many asymmetric
advantages.
This growing strength confronts America with unprecedented choices. For forty
years, both the US\u2013China relationship and the Asian strategic order have been
built on Chinese acceptance of America\u2019s superior power. At first this simply
reflected a recognition of reality. When Nixon met Mao in 1972, China\u2019s economy
was less than one-twentieth the size of America\u2019s. Beijing calculated then that it
had no choice, in its own interest, but to accept an unequal relationship. In doing
so, China relinquished its status as a great power in Asia, but only ever as a
temporary expedient. Now that it is stronger, the calculations have changed.
China believes it has the power to veto decisions it does not accept, and it is
willing to use that power.
These are ultimately matters of status and identity. The Chinese feel towards
their country, with all its achievements and for all its faults, in a way not so very
different from the way Americans feel towards theirs. They, too, believe their
country is exceptional and destined to lead. They see China as a great power. For
nearly two centuries, China has been deprived of that status by other powers.
Now that it has grown wealthy and strong again, nothing is more important to
China than to reclaim its place as a leader in Asia. The Chinese will continue to
avoid unnecessary friction and minimise the risk of confrontation. But they will
not relinquish their country\u2019s claim to status as a great power \u2013 even if that leads
to conflict. The implications of this for America are simple and very significant. If
America tries to preserve the status quo and avoid fundamental change in the
relationship, it will be choosing to accept China as a strategic rival.
The need for a decision seems to have emerged very suddenly. China\u2019s economic
growth has been obvious, but not where it has been leading. Only a few years
ago, serious people were talking of America as a new Rome, whose
unchallengeable power would make this century even more an American
Century than the last. America has been the world\u2019s richest and most powerful
nation for so long that it seems inevitable, and essential to its nature, that it will
remain so. It is indeed quite wrong to see America as a country in decline,
because in itself America remains a remarkably vibrant and innovative society
and economy. But it is equally wrong to imply, as American political leaders
often do, that its relative position in the world of power is not changing. This
overlooks the simple mathematical fact that when we talk about relative power,
America\u2019s trajectory is only half the story, and not the half that matters right
now. The shift in power is being driven by China\u2019s rise, not by America\u2019s decline.
There is not much America can do about it.
Likewise, it has been easy to assume that China will continue to accept the
existing US-led global and regional order. China has appeared too preoccupied
with economic growth and social stability to bother about challenging US
leadership, and has not shown the ideological fervour or territorial appetites that
have driven ambitious rising powers in the past. For reasons of its own, China
has been happy for America to underestimate its power and ambitions as these
have grown. But over the past couple of years, China\u2019s challenge has become
clear, and so has America\u2019s need to decide how to respond.
Essentially, America has three options. It can resist China\u2019s challenge and try to
preserve the status quo in Asia. It can step back from its dominant role in Asia,
leaving China to attempt to establish hegemony. Or it can remain in Asia on a
new basis, allowing China a larger role but also maintaining a strong presence of
its own. Most Americans assume that the first of these options is the only choice.
Only a few take the second option seriously, although that could change. Most
don\u2019t even consider the third.
The China Choice explores the alternatives and in particular the third option, in
order to argue that it is the one that best serves American interests. Many people
doubt that the third option really exists. They assume that there are really only
two alternatives. The argument goes that unless America maintains its
benevolent leadership of Asia, the region will inevitably fall under Chinese
leadership, which is likely to be much less benevolent. If that were true, America
would have to choose between defending its leadership in Asia or surrendering
the region to Chinese domination. The argument for defending the status quo
would then be very strong.
I argue that over the next few decades neither America nor China will be strong
enough to lead Asia in the way America has done since 1972. Each will be able to
deny leadership to the other. The hope that America can maintain uncontested
leadership in Asia is therefore as illusory as the fear that China will be able to
dominate Asia in its place.
In truth, any attempt by either Beijing or Washington to dominate will lead to
sustained and bitter strategic rivalry, imposing huge economic costs and a real
risk of catastrophic war. Neither side could win, and both would stand to lose a
great deal \u2013 but it could easily happen. Strategic competition quickly builds its
own momentum, escalating to the point where war can seem inescapable. War
between the United States and China is already a clear and significant danger,
one that will grow if rivalry increases. This is the most important issue at stake
in America\u2019s China choice. Asia\u2019s alternative futures are not American or Chinese
supremacy. They are escalating rivalry, or some form of great-power
accommodation that constrains that rivalry. America\u2019s real choice is not between
dominating or withdrawing from Asia: it is between taking China on as a
strategic rival, or working with it as a partner.
The third option carries many obvious risks, which would quickly rule it out of
contention were it not for the greater risks that flow from the alternatives.
Moreover, this option can only be realised if America and China are willing to
compromise with each other. Neither side will find that easy. For China it will
mean abandoning hopes to lead Asia and accepting a strong US presence there
indefinitely. For America it will mean accepting that its unique leadership role is
no longer feasible, and learning to work with China as a partner in a way that
America has never done with another country before \u2013 and certainly not with
one so different from it. But this is the kind of choice America must now
consider.
This is an extract from The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power by
Hugh White, published by Black Inc. The China Choice will be released on Monday
6 August, RRP $29.99, and is also available as an ebook.
http:\/\/www.blackincbooks.com\/books\/china-choice<\/p>\n

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