Regarding the reference, you have to use the resource i send to you and plus the resources you find. At least 5 resources for each one. Also, you have to use the theory from the lecture note and indicate the reference from the notes (week number and slides pages). There is no restriction on the theory you choose.<\/p>\n
Because it is two separate essay, pls send me seperate reference.<\/p>\n
The two articles are, i send it in the attachment. Regarding the necessary resources, i send to you in the next email. Thx<\/p>\n
1. Alc\u00e1cer, J., & Zhao, M. (2016). Zooming in: A practical manual for identifying geographic<\/p>\n
clusters. Strategic Management Journal, 37(1), 10-21.<\/p>\n
2. Aguilera, R. V., Flores, R., & Kim, J. U. (2015). Re-examining regional borders and the<\/p>\n
multinational enterprise. Multinational Business Review, 23(4), 374-394.
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\n?? 8 ???
\narticle 1.pdf(754K)
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\narticle 2.pdf(265K)
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\nLecture Notes Week 2.pdf(574K)
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\nLecture_ week 1.pdf(2M)
\n???? ????
\nLecture_ week 3.pdf(1M)
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\nLecture_ week 4.pdf(3M)
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\nLecture_ week 5.pdf(2M)
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\nMGF5966 Assessment Task 2.pdf(191K)
\n???? ????
\nThe China Choice: Why America Should Share Power
\nBy Hugh White
\nAustralia\u2019s future depends on America and China. They are now the world\u2019s two
\nrichest and strongest countries, and they are by far the two most important
\ncountries in the world to us. If they get on well, Asia\u2019s future is bright and
\nAustralia has a good chance of peace and prosperity. If they get on badly, our
\nfuture is bleak. Their economies are deeply intertwined, and day-to-day business
\nbetween them is generally managed well. But as China\u2019s power grows, there is an
\nincreasing undercurrent of rivalry that raises big questions about their longterm
\nrelationship, and what it means for the future. Will they find a way to live in
\npeace with each other, or will they become strategic competitors \u2013 even
\nenemies? Will Asia enjoy many more decades of peace and stability, or will it be
\ndevastated by conflict?
\nThe answers are far from clear. Peace and stability are certainly possible, but the
\nrisk of rivalry and conflict is also quite real. Which it will be depends more than
\nanything else on choices that will be made over the next few years in Washington
\nand Beijing. Each country will have to decide how far it is willing to adjust its
\nambitions and aspirations to accommodate the other. Either one of them can
\npush the relationship towards rivalry by asserting its ambitions too ruthlessly.
\nOnly together can they make the mutual concessions needed to pull back
\ntowards cooperation. Both, therefore, share responsibility for avoiding disaster.
\nThis book is about America\u2019s part in that shared responsibility.
\nThe choices for America are quite urgent: Washington and Beijing are already
\nsliding towards rivalry by default, seeing each other more and more as strategic
\ncompetitors. The relationship between the world\u2019s two richest and strongest
\nstates will always be competitive; the question is whether that competition still
\nallows them to trade and invest with each other, cooperate to solve shared
\nproblems, and contribute to maintain a stable international order.
\nCompetition becomes dangerous when concerns about status and security
\nbecome so intense that they preclude cooperation in other areas, and the quest
\nfor political, strategic or military advantage becomes the overriding priority. This
\nis the path down which America and China are already taking the first steps.
\nWhile for the most part their overt language remains cautious, they are building
\ntheir forces and adapting their military plans specifically with the other in mind;
\nseeking support from other Asian countries; and seeing regional questions, like
\nthe South China Sea disputes, more and more through the lens of rivalry.
\nThe further this goes on, the harder it will be to change course and choose
\ncooperation.
\nAmerica\u2019s choices about China are among the most important and difficult it has
\never faced. They are important because serious rivalry with China would be very
\ncostly and dangerous, and conflict could be catastrophic. They are difficult
\nbecause they touch on deep questions about America\u2019s role in the world, and
\ntherefore about America itself. China raises these questions because, in one
\nfundamental way, it is different from any country America has ever dealt with: it
\nis richer and more powerful.
\nWithin a few years China is set to have a larger economy than America, becoming
\nthe first country to do so since America overtook Britain in the 1880s. By midcentury,
\non some estimates, China\u2019s GDP could be double America\u2019s.
\nChina\u2019s wealth changes America\u2019s relationship with it because the old saying is
\nright: ultimately, wealth is power. America itself has shown this to be true, with
\nits global power built on its economic preponderance. Now China\u2019s swift
\neconomic rise is driving a rapid shift in relative strategic and political power.
\nChina still lags well behind America on many measures, but in almost every case
\nthe long-term trends are going its way. China does not even need to overtake
\nAmerica to pose a very serious challenge: its economy is already larger relative
\nto America\u2019s than the Soviet Union\u2019s ever was. That makes China, in the long run,
\nmore formidable than the Soviets were at the height of the Cold War. And in Asia,
\nwhere Chinese and American power meet, China enjoys many asymmetric
\nadvantages.
\nThis growing strength confronts America with unprecedented choices. For forty
\nyears, both the US\u2013China relationship and the Asian strategic order have been
\nbuilt on Chinese acceptance of America\u2019s superior power. At first this simply
\nreflected a recognition of reality. When Nixon met Mao in 1972, China\u2019s economy
\nwas less than one-twentieth the size of America\u2019s. Beijing calculated then that it
\nhad no choice, in its own interest, but to accept an unequal relationship. In doing
\nso, China relinquished its status as a great power in Asia, but only ever as a
\ntemporary expedient. Now that it is stronger, the calculations have changed.
\nChina believes it has the power to veto decisions it does not accept, and it is
\nwilling to use that power.
\nThese are ultimately matters of status and identity. The Chinese feel towards
\ntheir country, with all its achievements and for all its faults, in a way not so very
\ndifferent from the way Americans feel towards theirs. They, too, believe their
\ncountry is exceptional and destined to lead. They see China as a great power. For
\nnearly two centuries, China has been deprived of that status by other powers.
\nNow that it has grown wealthy and strong again, nothing is more important to
\nChina than to reclaim its place as a leader in Asia. The Chinese will continue to
\navoid unnecessary friction and minimise the risk of confrontation. But they will
\nnot relinquish their country\u2019s claim to status as a great power \u2013 even if that leads
\nto conflict. The implications of this for America are simple and very significant. If
\nAmerica tries to preserve the status quo and avoid fundamental change in the
\nrelationship, it will be choosing to accept China as a strategic rival.
\nThe need for a decision seems to have emerged very suddenly. China\u2019s economic
\ngrowth has been obvious, but not where it has been leading. Only a few years
\nago, serious people were talking of America as a new Rome, whose
\nunchallengeable power would make this century even more an American
\nCentury than the last. America has been the world\u2019s richest and most powerful
\nnation for so long that it seems inevitable, and essential to its nature, that it will
\nremain so. It is indeed quite wrong to see America as a country in decline,
\nbecause in itself America remains a remarkably vibrant and innovative society
\nand economy. But it is equally wrong to imply, as American political leaders
\noften do, that its relative position in the world of power is not changing. This
\noverlooks the simple mathematical fact that when we talk about relative power,
\nAmerica\u2019s trajectory is only half the story, and not the half that matters right
\nnow. The shift in power is being driven by China\u2019s rise, not by America\u2019s decline.
\nThere is not much America can do about it.
\nLikewise, it has been easy to assume that China will continue to accept the
\nexisting US-led global and regional order. China has appeared too preoccupied
\nwith economic growth and social stability to bother about challenging US
\nleadership, and has not shown the ideological fervour or territorial appetites that
\nhave driven ambitious rising powers in the past. For reasons of its own, China
\nhas been happy for America to underestimate its power and ambitions as these
\nhave grown. But over the past couple of years, China\u2019s challenge has become
\nclear, and so has America\u2019s need to decide how to respond.
\nEssentially, America has three options. It can resist China\u2019s challenge and try to
\npreserve the status quo in Asia. It can step back from its dominant role in Asia,
\nleaving China to attempt to establish hegemony. Or it can remain in Asia on a
\nnew basis, allowing China a larger role but also maintaining a strong presence of
\nits own. Most Americans assume that the first of these options is the only choice.
\nOnly a few take the second option seriously, although that could change. Most
\ndon\u2019t even consider the third.
\nThe China Choice explores the alternatives and in particular the third option, in
\norder to argue that it is the one that best serves American interests. Many people
\ndoubt that the third option really exists. They assume that there are really only
\ntwo alternatives. The argument goes that unless America maintains its
\nbenevolent leadership of Asia, the region will inevitably fall under Chinese
\nleadership, which is likely to be much less benevolent. If that were true, America
\nwould have to choose between defending its leadership in Asia or surrendering
\nthe region to Chinese domination. The argument for defending the status quo
\nwould then be very strong.
\nI argue that over the next few decades neither America nor China will be strong
\nenough to lead Asia in the way America has done since 1972. Each will be able to
\ndeny leadership to the other. The hope that America can maintain uncontested
\nleadership in Asia is therefore as illusory as the fear that China will be able to
\ndominate Asia in its place.
\nIn truth, any attempt by either Beijing or Washington to dominate will lead to
\nsustained and bitter strategic rivalry, imposing huge economic costs and a real
\nrisk of catastrophic war. Neither side could win, and both would stand to lose a
\ngreat deal \u2013 but it could easily happen. Strategic competition quickly builds its
\nown momentum, escalating to the point where war can seem inescapable. War
\nbetween the United States and China is already a clear and significant danger,
\none that will grow if rivalry increases. This is the most important issue at stake
\nin America\u2019s China choice. Asia\u2019s alternative futures are not American or Chinese
\nsupremacy. They are escalating rivalry, or some form of great-power
\naccommodation that constrains that rivalry. America\u2019s real choice is not between
\ndominating or withdrawing from Asia: it is between taking China on as a
\nstrategic rival, or working with it as a partner.
\nThe third option carries many obvious risks, which would quickly rule it out of
\ncontention were it not for the greater risks that flow from the alternatives.
\nMoreover, this option can only be realised if America and China are willing to
\ncompromise with each other. Neither side will find that easy. For China it will
\nmean abandoning hopes to lead Asia and accepting a strong US presence there
\nindefinitely. For America it will mean accepting that its unique leadership role is
\nno longer feasible, and learning to work with China as a partner in a way that
\nAmerica has never done with another country before \u2013 and certainly not with
\none so different from it. But this is the kind of choice America must now
\nconsider.
\nThis is an extract from The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power by
\nHugh White, published by Black Inc. The China Choice will be released on Monday
\n6 August, RRP $29.99, and is also available as an ebook.
\nhttp:\/\/www.blackincbooks.com\/books\/china-choice<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Regarding the reference, you have to use the resource i send to you and plus the resources you find. At least 5 resources for each one. Also, you have to use the theory from the lecture note and indicate the Read More …<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-237524","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/237524","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=237524"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/237524\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=237524"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=237524"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=237524"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}