{"id":237130,"date":"2018-02-20T23:50:30","date_gmt":"2018-02-20T23:50:30","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/essaysparlor.com\/problem-set-2-econ-650-1-watson-chapter-7-exercise-2-2\/"},"modified":"2018-10-24T09:15:07","modified_gmt":"2018-10-24T09:15:07","slug":"problem-set-2-econ-650-1-watson-chapter-7-exercise-2-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/problem-set-2-econ-650-1-watson-chapter-7-exercise-2-2\/","title":{"rendered":"PROBLEM SET 2 Econ 650 1. WATSON Chapter 7, Exercise 2."},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Question<br \/>\nPROBLEM SET 2<br \/>\nEcon 650<br \/>\n1. WATSON Chapter 7, Exercise 2.<\/p>\n<p>2. Differentiated Bertrand Competition. There are two firms i = 1, 2 simultaneously<br \/>\nchoosing prices pi ? [0, 1]. The demand of firm i is Di (pi , p?i ) = 1 ? 3pi + p?i and<br \/>\nit has zero production costs. That is, firm i\u2019s payoff is pi Di (pi , p?i ).<br \/>\n(a) Find the best response function of firm i.<br \/>\n(b) Find the set of 1-rationalizable, 2-rationalizable and 3-rationalizable strategies.<br \/>\n(c) Do you think there is a unique rationalizable strategy profile? Justify your<br \/>\nanswer.<\/p>\n<p>3. Consider the following Guessing Game. There are n = 10 players simultaneously<br \/>\nchoosing a number in {1, 2, 3}. The winners are those closest to 1\/2 the average<br \/>\nguess (they evenly split the prize between the winners if there is more than one).<br \/>\nFind the set of rationalizable strategy profiles. Justify your answer.<\/p>\n<p>4. Two players find themselves in a legal battle over a patent. The patent is worth 20<br \/>\nfor each player, so the winner would receive 20 and the loser 0. Given the norms of<br \/>\nthe country they are in, it is common to bribe the judge of a case. Each player can<br \/>\nsecretly offer a bribe of 0, 9 or 20, and the one whose bribe is the largest is awarded<br \/>\nthe patent. If both choose not to bribe, or if the bribes are the same amount, then<br \/>\neach has an equal chance of being awarded the patent. (If a player decides to bribe<br \/>\nthen the judge pockets it regardless of who gets the patent).<br \/>\n(a) Derive the game matrix.<br \/>\n(b) Is the game dominance solvable? If so, find the strategy profile surviving<br \/>\nIDSDS. 1<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Question PROBLEM SET 2 Econ 650 1. WATSON Chapter 7, Exercise 2. 2. Differentiated Bertrand Competition. There are two firms i = 1, 2 simultaneously choosing prices pi ? [0, 1]. The demand of firm i is Di (pi , <a href=\"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/problem-set-2-econ-650-1-watson-chapter-7-exercise-2-2\/\" class=\"read-more\">Read More &#8230;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-237130","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/237130","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=237130"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/237130\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=237130"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=237130"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.benedictsol.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=237130"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}